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1. Introduction 
 
Innovation is generally regarded as a universal and positive element of economic life. 
However, it is an apparent paradox that not all innovations are good, nor are they necessarily 
an improvement on those which they replace. We have all experienced the ‘novelty’ gadget 
that is quickly forgotten, or the new special effects-heavy, multi-million dollars, blockbuster film 
that fails at the box office. We cannot dismiss this as the fickleness of taste, there are a number 
of well-documented examples of the inferior technology ‘winning’: the classic case in video 
recording technology is the VHS format replacing the technically superior Betamax 
(Cusumano, Mylonadis et al. 1992). Put simply, the lesson is that neither technical nor artistic 
superiority consistently bear a simple or direct relationship with economic or cultural success. 
The important point is that the value of innovation is not universal but its value is established 
in context. This applies more generally, but in the field of the cultural economy the situation is 
more critical than in other fields. In the cultural economy the ‘value’ is the product or practice. 
Moreover, social or cultural values change, serving to ‘re-value’ an object or practice, at any 
stage in the production process between ideation and use. In this chapter I explore how such 
instability and change in the ‘value’ of innovations may need to be re-positioned at the centre 
of our analyses; challenging what we find in mainstream analyses of innovation where such 
rouge characteristics are regarded as ‘exceptional’ or peripheral. I conclude that insights from 
innovation processes in the cultural economy should prompt us to re-frame our analyses not 
only of the cultural economy but of the rest of the economy as well. 
 
The first question I pose concerns the assumption that all industries operate essentially in the 
same way with regard to the market with regards to allocation and price setting. Is innovation 
any different in the cultural economy, or to any other industries? If so, why and how? If the 
cultural economy was ‘different’ this characteristic would potentially be the causal variable. 
The normative perspective is that the cultural economy is different: this paper challenges this. 
Paradoxically, I will argue that innovation is no different in the cultural economy. However, 
more disruptively, I will argue that it is our conceptualisation of innovation, based upon mass 
production industries is what leads us to view the industries of the cultural economy as 
‘different’. The problem lies in how we conceive of knowledge and innovation. 
 
The foundational intervention is to conceptualise knowledge as relational: that it shapes, and 
is shaped by, context and agency. The values (cultural and economic) of an innovative product 
or practice are only temporarily fixed in each interaction. Exploring innovation in the cultural 
economy discloses many problematic assumptions about innovation in the normative 
literature; sociologists and economic geographers have begun to query these norms. These 
assumptions may have been appropriate to a particular period of mass production of 
commodities, however it can be argued the assumptions no longer hold. Rather than being 
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assumptions, they may have to be moved analytically centre stage: to become ‘what is to be 
explained’. 
 
In sum, I want to reverse normative arguments on the basis of three challenger claims. First, 
I will argue that our expectations of innovation have been limited by a specific experience of 
industrial transformation of mass production and a particular division of labour. I will argue 
further that the cultural economy should be the ‘new normal’. Second, I also argue against 
generalisation, recognising that all industries have empirical differences, both within and 
between what we term ‘industries’. In short, the situated nature of innovation is critical to our 
understanding of it. Finally, I am led to ask fundamental questions about what knowledge is. 
Accordingly, this chapter is divided into three parts. First, I review normative innovation 
practices and their relationship to the philosophy of science. Second, I argue that due to 
normative assumptions about knowledge, the focus of analysis and empirical investigation is 
on the transfer of knowledge. The third part proposes that a more helpful focus: namely the 
translation of knowledge, one that expresses the generative, relational, and the situated nature 
of knowledge making. The normative model of the ‘leaky pipe’ analogy of knowledge-transfer 
where the very formation is concerned with incremental change (Godin 2006). By contrast, I 
want to offer the notion of ‘making in translation’ is conceived of as a constructive and a 
constitutive practice: one that is focused on radical change. 
 
2. Normal Innovation, normal science 
 
 
a. Controlled innovation 
 
Innovation is a deceptively simple term; we commonly view it as a technique or an outcome 
(but less commonly do we note that it is not absolute: such that something is only innovative 
‘in relation to’ something else) to produce something ‘new’. The model that we often have in 
mind is to ‘build a better mousetrap’, an incremental improvement to an established need. The 
problem and the parameters are assumed or fixed, an incremental iteration is what is defined 
as innovation. Our common understanding of innovation comes from science, where we term 
a discovery as a ‘natural fact’ what is commonly conceived of as if a pebble on a beach, simply 
waiting to be discovered, or picked up (its meaning is intrinsic and not related to time or place, 
let along social and cultural settings). Inside the laboratory discovery is a codified and ordered 
process is followed - insulated from the social world - that is tried and tested to confirm or deny 
‘newness’. Innovation, discovery and innovation, or newness, are profoundly socially, 
culturally and organisationally embedded. However, in normal science, or normal innovation, 
we ‘bracket out’ these ‘contextual’ factors. This strategy does have utility when wider social 
and economic processes are stable. However in periods of social and economic 
transformation their explanatory powers are weakened. 
 
The paradox here is between the model (philosophy) of science and the practice of ‘normal 
science’, that is the science that can only produce incremental and not revolutionary 
innovation. Such a (normative) process relies upon a stable value system of both facts and 
interpretation. We know that the ‘value’ of an innovation is not always stable. The instability - 
or indeterminacy - is clearest in science when one moves away from the strictly applied, and 
from the confines of the laboratory: ‘blue skies research’ is knowledge that does not have a 
ready application, but at some point it may do. Even in normal manufacture a product 
innovation may be ‘new’, but may not find a market nor use. As we will note below, this relates 
to a major question in the philosophy of science and how revolutionary it is, or is not. There 
are other ways to catch mice; moreover, we might change our perspective to see mice as the 
solution, not the problem. A revolutionary innovation may do away with the very need for a 
mousetrap. 
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Thus, ’normal’ innovation is both a method that may be limiting, and one that is - or aspires to 
be - a-social, or a-contextual. Both aspects are problematic for anything other than incremental 
change (which we generally might not consider to be ‘real innovation’) within fixed and non-
variable environments. What makes an innovation ‘different’, or ‘interesting’ , let alone useful 
or important, is only disclosed by its social and cultural value: its relational value. What is 
innovative today, may be normal and uninteresting tomorrow; what is ‘world changing’ for one 
group of people, or in a particular place, may be uninteresting in another. Normal science, that 
is the standard model of science that we are familiar with, is based upon incremental change. 
It is effective in contexts where a paradigm (in this case a market, set of values and 
technology) is fixed and limited. Incrementalism is the characteristic of ‘mature’ products and 
the middle of their life cycle (i.e. when innovation is at a low point)(Balland, De Vaan et al. 
2012).  
 
It was Kuhn (1962), a prominent philosopher of science, who contrasted notions of normal 
and revolutionary science. Normal science is path-dependent and means that scientists don't 
have to think about the big questions of meaning and knowledge as long as they follow the 
small rules of the scientific method. Kuhn pointed out that the logical flaw in such an 
incremental method to produce ‘true’ innovations. In much of the work on the sociology of 
scientific knowledge since Kuhn, fundamental questions of logic, and of meaning now 
undermine the normative scientific method as any adequate account of scientific practice. A 
number of economic geographers and sociologists have sought to challenge these 
assumptions (Amin and Cohendet 2003, Ibert 2007), but little of this insight has found its way 
into normative analyses of innovation. 
 
 
b. Innovation in the wild 
 
The cultural economy is comprised of a sub-section of all production, and normally further 
constrained in definition to be identified as a particular group of industries that have as their 
output ‘cultural products. It seeks to point to a wider cultural economy defined by processes 
as well as output, or input. Recent practice has been to use the notion of the cultural economy 
to indicate this diversity of product, process or social context. Traditional industrial 
classifications are composed of taxonomies of final product, and not always process, can be 
limiting. Hence, the term cultural or creative economy is used to capture this more holistic 
view; one that encompasses the whole production system from ideation, production and 
distribution to consumption and archiving. This is usually referred to as the cultural economy 
ecosystem (Pratt 1997) 
 
These definitions and conceptualisations have been developed to capture the actually existing 
process of cultural production, something that is neglected by normative taxonomies and 
analyses that only frame ‘cultural occupations’, or final producers of cultural products. In the 
example of film making this would be like: a. only considering the actors and director but 
excluding the ‘below the line’ technical talent: the huge list of names we see in the credits of 
a film; and b. only considering film production companies (and ignoring the finance and 
administration, the special effects, the distribution, sales and advertising, etc.). Quite literally 
much of the innovation ‘falls between the cracks’ of normative conceptualisations. This 
contrasts with the cultural economy ecosystem conceptualisation which holds open the fact 
that there is considerable empirical variation within the industries that comprise the cultural 
economy. Put simply, film is empirically different to theatre, and to fine art; however, it shares 
some important organisational characteristics, risk profile, and market structures. 
 
The contrast of the cultural economy with the normative (manufacturing) economy is important 
if we are to appreciate that concepts of innovation are built on the assumptions, and empirical 
regularities, of the normative economy. The linear, atomistic and truncated production process 
that echoes a Fordist production line is but one type of production and a particular innovation 
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system has been developed to satisfy its characteristics (marginal improvements in 
technology, different product styling and decorative effects). However, cultural production is 
better characterised through the exploration of its ecosystem (a more comparatively 
variegated and heterogeneous field). Moreover, as an organisational system cultural 
production tends to a ‘missing middle’ form: there tend to be a small number of very large 
companies, and many micro-companies and freelancers. Compared to the normative pyramid 
structure of much of the economy, the cultural economy has a lack of middle sized companies. 
In addition the micro-enterprises, which dominate the sector add a distinct organisation 
element, work on the basis of project based activities, where a project, and a company, may 
exist for only 6 months (Pratt 2007); at which point the company may be disbanded, and 
recombined into another company/project with others.  
 
Generally, the cultural economy is organised to solve the challenges go working with an 
unstable notion of ‘value’, both economic and cultural. Values change faster than new product 
innovation can keep pace: literally with fashion seasons, or the charts. Accordingly, product 
development cycles are very short, and product life can be equally brief. As such the market 
characteristics of these industries are a. that they are very risky (that is there is a high failure 
rate, and uncertainty of what a success will be), b. that there is a ‘winner takes all’ structure, 
the product that is a success can achieve monopoly profits. What may appear to be peculiar 
organisational forms and practices from a normative perspective are in fact innovative 
responses to particular conditions. 
 
Likewise, the field of regulation is intrinsic to the form of the economy. Regulators are 
concerned with both content and competition: censorship and monopolies. There is commonly 
a complex relationship between these. Historically, state ownership has been a dominant 
form. In the UK, as with many states, regulatory changes have changed the organisation of 
the cultural economy. For example the shift from in-house, fully integrated, production of 
programmes, to the BBC being mainly a ‘publisher’, has led to the emergence of fragmented 
and horizontal organisational structure where risks are outsourced from ‘publisher’ to 
‘producer’ (Pratt and Gornostaeva 2009). Other regulation can affect the structure of the 
industry in different ways. For example, the rules in Formula 1 racing are changed annually to 
destabilise technologies and team structures; in effect to increase economic risk, and generate 
innovation. So, as with Formula One racing, innovation is always judged in relation to a set of 
rules, regulations or structures: it is not simply to go faster, but to win. Regulation literally 
constructs and shapes the market and defines the terms of competition and value (Pinch, 
Henry et al. 2003). 
 
Finally, there are two further ways in which the cultural economy contrasts with normative 
expectations of industrial production which are linear and uni-directional. This is well illustrated 
by the case of advertising. Advertising - itself a member of the cultural economy - is deployed 
in all areas of manufacture to not just inform the market of a product’s existence, but to create 
a demand for it. Simply, there was no expressed need previously: advertising manufactures 
demand. A well-documented example is that of the development of the personal music player, 
the first iteration of which was Sony’s Walkman (Du Gay 1997), itself a development of the 
transistor radio, but this time personalised. It is not only manufacture that works in this way, 
artists have agents and galleries who perform the same task with a nascent ‘star’ (White and 
White 1993). Interviews and background briefings provide the interpretive context, and create 
a ‘buzz’ and a desire for the art. 
 
This process of non-linearity, multi-directionality, and feedback, has been necessarily taken 
to new levels by the cultural economy (Pratt and Jeffcutt 2009). The marketing of music is but 
one example. The organisational form of the ‘charts’ that not only signals availability, but ‘what 
other people are buying’, and equates that with a social, cultural and economic value. People 
purchase the new recording, or see the new film, either sight unseen, or on the basis of 
information that constructs its value (for example, advertising: the paid form; news reports a 
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non-paid form of value construction). In the cultural economy demand has to be created, to 
drive demand for an existing supply of goods that the market did not know it needed. 
 
The conditions of a highly regulated mass production system create certain situated values 
on which territory competition is fought out. In turn, these shape the ‘innovation process’, and 
are valued in terms of their role in competition. To reflect back to arguments about the product 
cycle, these are all efforts to avoid the high risk situation of creating a new ‘class of products’ 
for which demand is unknowable and unknown. The work involved is often one of convincing 
consumers that the old product is no longer innovative, and that the new one is; moreover, 
that they should replace the old with the new (even though it is still functional) is risky and 
expensive. Hence, we can see lots of reasons why in manufacture there is sometimes an 
inbuilt (anti)-innovation. 
 
As many authors have pointed out we are currently experiencing a wider ‘culturalisation’ of 
the economy (Lash and Urry 1993). What this means is that the processes that are familiar 
throughout the cultural industries increasingly shape more ‘utilitarian’ products like a laptop or 
a toaster. Market differentiation is produced by the ‘valuing’ of technologies (which may or 
may not ‘really, make a difference), or simply design (it looks good; a judgement that is of 
course cultural and relational) (Lash and Lury 2007). Perhaps the best example is car design 
in the late 1950s with the sculpting of bodywork that signified that year’s product, and hence 
encouraged product turnover (even without the built in obsolescence which was also 
notorious). Or, today, the sales of computers, and the role of companies such as Apple whose 
sales pitch is based on the design characteristics rather than ‘raw processing power’. Of 
course, ‘raw processing power’ is - like with engine specifications in cars - a relational term, 
that appears factual: bigger is better. It all depends on the use and the relationship between 
other components and software. Whilst one may seek to dismiss the ‘cultural clothing’ of the 
product, if it is that value which is the differentiator between two products that the relatively 
small cultural value will translate into a big economic value. In this case a true winner takes 
all: the final differentiation is sale or no sale. 
 
To summarise thus far. The process of creation has been black boxed and isolated. Normative 
processes are used to create change; but overwhelmingly these are targeted to incremental 
change. It is assumed that the intrinsic value of the product will win a market when it leaves 
the lab. Even ‘alternatives’ referred to as open innovation which appear to break down the 
walls of the ‘black box’ of innovation in fact retain all of the normative characteristics of 
standard innovation, the openness is a facet of network configuration, not of logic, nor the 
conception of knowledge (Trott and Hartmann 2009).  
 
By contrast, as we have seen, particularly in the cultural field, but increasingly (and less 
acknowledged) in the wider product field, the relational value, and the cultural sign, is a critical 
generator of ‘value’ (not all technical). Even when the apparent proportion of ‘cultural value’ in 
a product is small, the market impact may be total. Hence, we need to look more carefully at 
relational value construction. Clearly, this is front and centre of any consideration of the cultural 
economy, but one that applies to all industries. In a previous period, the weighted balance was 
to a ‘locked in’ intrinsic value, but the unbundling of this value in the current period has made 
all industries more like the conditions that we observe in the cultural industries. The problem 
is that the model we have for understanding innovation is based on a rather limited version of 
practice in manufacture that privileges technology and reduces market and knowledge to 
givens. (for example, neo-classical models). What we need is a model that positions these 
issues centrally, not peripherally. 
 
3. Transfer 
 
In the normative conception of innovation, whether in the laboratory, or the studio, by an artist 
or the practitioner generates the product as self-formed and self -referential object. Knowledge 
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is produced as a product and is fixed at creation (the ‘Eureka!’ moment). The process of 
knowledge transfer is viewed as a separate process, albeit one beset by many barriers, usually 
expressed as broken linkages or leaky pipelines hindering the passage to the audience or 
consumer. The process is linear, and non-reversible, the challenge is defined as that which 
will overcome the obstacles in the way of even diffusion: from high concentration to low, from 
supply to demand. The dominant assumption is of an un-differentiated audience, who all 
demand, or value an innovation in the same way: precisely not the characteristics of a cultural 
audience. 
 
These conditions may apply more or less to all industrial production, but in the case of 
industries being transformed not only by new production processes, but also by the 
relationship of production to society the process is more: for example, mass customisation, 
active consumption, and ‘pro-sumption’ (these are all terms that refer to the dissolution of 
traditional boundaries, and the direction of process, between producers and consumers) 
(Tapscott and Williams 2006). The cultural economy represents a leading edge of such 
practices, where the value or content of knowledge varies as well as its modes of 
communication and transport. The current organisational forms of the cultural economy have 
evolved as a response to such conditions: market or audience relations, as well as fluid value 
systems. However, the a-social and a-organisational perspective we encounter in many 
studies are the main reasons why normative innovation theory offers less insight when applied 
to the cultural economy. I will highlight three dimensions in which we need to modify our 
perspectives: a. spatial, b. organisation and scale, and c. knowledge. 
 
a. spatial 
 
The normative literature leaves the technical aspects of innovation to philosophers and 
scientists, leaving it in a black box of innovation (Latour 2005), the only aspect of the process 
that is open to manipulation and interpretation is the movement of knowledge: that is what is 
to be explained. The models of knowledge transfer are rooted in physical analogy of diffusion 
models; a physical process of transfer from higher to lower concentrations, based on a 
tendency to entropy in closed energy systems (Easton 1992). In such a conception the 
knowledge object, is separate from the transport mechanism. 
 
It is this latter issue - that transport mechanism - which is also assumed in traditional economic 
theory as the invisible hand of the market. However, this issue and its failings has fascinated 
geographers concerned with the spatial and technological ‘friction’ of distance; literally the 
structure and economy of transport systems that create an irregular ‘cost surface’ (Smith 
1981). In these models price alone is used as an analogue of value, and economic equilibrium 
is hypothesised as the mechanism of transfer of ‘goods’, albeit modified by transport issues. 
Interestingly, debates about digitisation and the hypothesised reduction of transport costs to 
zero, have led some to claim the irrelevance of geography to knowledge transfer: the death of 
distance (Cairncross 1998), a claim that was not sustained by evidence (Pratt 2000). 
 
Subsequently, literature on industrial location that has attended to the various unrealistic, or 
unfeasible, assumptions in both the economic theories of location and the interactions of 
industrial production. Research has indicated the role of the social organisation of the 
production process over space, where transfer costs may be internalised and when new 
technologies change transport costs. At other periods innovation in the production process 
and/or social organisation, or changes in regulation, may lead to externalisation of not only 
transportation, but also research and development. However, in normative approaches these 
are all externalities. We should question a model’s utility when the residuals dominate the 
equation. 
 
b. Organisation and scale 
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The analysis of the role of organisation is undermined in some studies by their neo-classical 
economy assumptions in which organisation is not a variable. However, institutional 
approaches to both economics and sociology have highlighted organisation as the 
complementary other side of the coin to transportation. Within the multi-plant and multi-
function production process there may be economies of scale and useful ‘waste’ (Grabher 
1993). That is that complex processes may be costed and audited over a longer time period, 
or over multiple sites and profit centres. Some slack or ‘redundancy’ can offer useful 
opportunities for residence and sustainability, and the maintenance of economies of scale 
(which others may be lost in more ‘efficient’ organisations. Put concretely, the return on an 
investment is neither intrinsic, nor separate from, the organisation and governance regime it 
is embedded in it. An investment will, if audited at the end of month one be in deficit; after year 
ten it may be in profit.  Likewise, a research facility may have a number of failed outcomes, 
before a success. The principle is the same, the context or setting can frame profitability, not 
the process. If audited individually it might never, if governed by an over enthusiastic 
accountant, achieve the innovative gains. Furthermore, a small organisation devoting only a 
minimal resource budget of its effort to innovation may not achieve the economies of scale 
that a large one may do. 
 
The transitions in the history of economic organisations that have occurred between large 
multifaceted facilities where economies of scale are maximised has often been contrasted 
with the diversity of outcomes and flexibility, so called economies of scope that is a common 
outcome of network enterprises (Lundvall 1992). Thus the location, distribution and diffusion 
-the transport- of knowledge is not independent of the social organisation. In short innovation 
is not reducible to space, technology, or indeed social organisation: it is a hybrid. 
 
c. Knowledge 
 
A variant on the organisational aspects to innovation is to take account of the institutional 
embedded nature of knowledge, whilst still retaining an atomistic notion of knowledge and its 
creation: to search for the ‘essence’, or most ‘intense’ manifestation in the organisation or 
place; or occupation of, innovation activity (measured by added economic value). 
Conceptualising this is a very small a step away from discredited notion of ‘pure’ innovation, 
or creativity, that is commonly associated with artistic or scientific genius (Pratt 2008). In this 
literature, even the nominally institutional approach to innovation is undercut by the 
assumption of single or finite ‘source’ of innovation. A parallel argument has been applied to 
the cultural economy with respect to creativity. In part inspired by Richard Florida’s (2002) 
analyses of the ‘super-creative’ occupations in the creative class (which in his case apply 
particularly to ‘creative jobs’ in ‘non-creative industries’). It has been argued that a measure 
of ‘creative intensity’ that produces most added value (not simply patents, nor non-profit 
earning outputs) if identified it could also be used to target potential intervention (Bakhshi, 
Freeman et al. 2012). 
 
Where immaterial products are concerned, legal codification seeks to domesticate products 
‘as if’ they were objects that had eternal and unchanging parameters, regardless of context: 
for example, a patent.  In traditional analyses patents are used as a proxy of innovation (Acs, 
Anselin et al. 2002). This is problematic: a patent is only a potential innovation; untested nor 
verified in its own terms, let along within the context of a particular market or audience. There 
is no guarantee, in fact it is statistically unlikely, that it will be successful; only a minute 
proportion of patents get made into products, and fewer still successful products. A patent, or 
an idea, is merely one part of an extended innovation system that is required to validate, and 
value, an object and its relations to the world, let alone getting the ‘world’ to appreciate it. 
 
Albeit expressed in slightly different terms, this conception is underpinned by the same model 
of the innovation system; a variant in organisation, transport and transfer mechanisms. It is 
still a network in which nodes, or what flows, is assumed, and connection and volume of 
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interaction that is assumed as causal. This is an inherent problem of traditional social network 
analyses (Murdoch 1997). The focus is still on the velocity and volume of flows, and the 
technical or rational efficient of networks to maximise the transfer in an ideal space. What is 
overlooked are the means by which an idea is translated into practice, and the means by which 
it is ‘valued’, and ‘revalued’ at each interaction. As hinted above, this dimension is particularly 
relevant to accounting for the cultural economy: a (truly) relational model. 
 
I want to argue that despite some theoretical progress and some more nuanced empirical 
work two points remain unanswered: first, how is knowledge created; and second, how to 
divide up good from bad knowledge? It is interesting that these are considered as a priori 
assumptions, not worthy of analysis, or self-evident fact, in neo-classical analyses. On the 
contrary, I would argue that they are important and relevant to our understanding of innovation. 
On the second point, in the experimental process if the outcome is a binary- good or bad- this 
will give us one definitive answer. But, as we have already argued, even good (or indeed bad) 
outcomes can be re-valued outside the lab, or when the artist enters society. We are still left 
with the fundamental deceit at the core of science that Kuhn identified: ‘normal science’ will 
not, can cannot, produce revolutionary, paradigm changing, events. In other words, normal 
science is additive and deductive; but in the end it is limited by its own caution, it is not 
inductive, it cannot make a leap into the unknown (deductive processes are based on logical 
deduction from two known facts to a composite, or additive, fact). A variant of this problem in 
a more practical manner is the theory of innovation that suggests that the ‘product lifecycle’ is 
akin to separate paradigms, eventually after the new idea makes a market, it matures and no 
further innovation takes place; it is replaced by a new paradigm (in classical analysis, this is 
‘caused’ by substituting a new technology. The philosophical ‘trick’ is that a new product 
provides the new paradigm, without explaining where the new product/idea came from. 
 
In summary, much of our conception of knowledge creation is about knowledge transfer. 
Knowledge is ‘black boxed’, or wrapped as if in a parcel: the question of how the package was 
unpacked and how the contents were (re-)interpreted are not addressed; simply that it moved 
from A to B. Moreover, the ‘value of an innovation is assumed to be fixed and indexed by 
technological and economic reductivism, and atomism. The process of knowledge creation is 
displaced to the philosophy of science and practice thus follows the binary rules and protocols 
of the laboratory; knowledge and meaning is ‘assumed away’ or simply ignored for the 
purposes of economic, or spatial and social analyses. However, these assumptions, and this 
philosophy, can, and must be questioned. At very least the logic based on the normative mass 
manufacture and its innovation processes. In the modern cultural economy, these 
assumptions are now variables. 
 
 
4. Translation 
 
In the previous section I have criticised the exclusive focus on transfer mechanisms; the other 
side of the innovation coin is the ‘what is transferred’: knowledge and ‘newness’/innovation. 
As I have also noted in the first section of the chapter the science model codifies the production 
of knowledge as a logical, codified and technical process. It is created in the laboratory; the 
challenge is to migrate it to a user. Normative models have a particular conception of 
knowledge. In the process of reconstructing the understanding of innovation a potential line of 
critique emerges from studies of craft processes, and subtler innovation that they produce. 
The scientific method, and the laboratory, produce a singular output. The attention to craft skill 
highlights the tension between learning, and doing; or between tacit and codified knowledge.  
 
Normative concepts of innovation solely concern codified knowledge, in words and numbers, 
legal terms, or physical objects. The notion of tacit knowledge opens up a realm of non-
codified, practical knowledge, and the varied process of learning and doing (Polanyi 1957). 
Tacit knowledge is always and already embodied and embedded in place and organisations; 
  Page 9 of 13 
whereas codified knowledge can be transferred (more like the ‘ideal’ knowledge discussed 
above). Codified knowledge is often seen as ‘soft’ knowledge, both in the boundary less 
indefinability, but also in value judgements (and accordingly not judged as valuable as real 
science). A common interpretation is that this two forms of knowledge exist in parallel realms, 
another that tacit knowledge - which applies to a limited class of knowledge - can be quantified 
and hence reduced to a common score. This produces an additive notion of knowledge, and 
it obscures the ‘valuation’ and its reductivism via quantification. 
 
A similar problem underpins network analyses, even those that stress the ‘relational’ 
dimension. Although more informative, embedded and nuanced, they still fall foul of the basic 
assumption of network analysis that is to measure flows, not their (co-)creation. The relative 
value of knowledge is dictated by the network structure, one that is more or less efficient at 
diffusion (Bathelt and Gluckler 2011). They do not fully question the additive notion of 
knowledge(s), nor the implicit accumulation and rational assumptions of normative network 
analyses. 
 
By contrast, translation theories of innovation use a different notion of knowledge, a generative 
one. In such an approach two knowledge inputs do not simply add or subtract from one 
another, they produce contestation which may lead to the revaluation of both inputs, and/or, 
a completely novel resolution. Thus challenging the binary between the knowledge and the 
transfer which is the research object of traditional analyses (and which ‘locks up’ value 
questions). Translation analyses begin with a different ontology, they view the whole process 
as actors, things and networks all co-defining one another. As the name suggests, the 
literature that underpins this approach is Actor Network Theory (ANT). It is especially relevant 
that ANT has its roots in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK), that is the sociology of 
experimentation and ‘knowledge making’. A seminal example is based on the re-interpretation 
of laboratory practice ( Latour and Woolgar 1986), although recent work has extended the 
process of ‘valuation’ and ‘justification’ practices into what are cognate areas for those 
interested in the economy, on financial dealing and markets (Callon 1998, Knorr-Cetina and 
Preda 2006). 
 
Generative notions of knowledge explore how knowledge is created via interaction and 
justificatory disputation, not by simple addition. A good example is the way that a play or music 
performance is developed in front of an audience via the feedback and the live experience of 
the performance. The technical practice is modified via not just the interpretive actions of 
director and performer, but by their assessment of audience reaction, and their own 
aspirations and values. This is but one, or a multiple example, of interactive and heuristic 
feedback. Then comes the process of problem solving, how and which issues to resolve (Pratt 
2015). We can immediately see the weakness of a transfer model of the practice in the 
example of how the composer’s idea of the music (based on their education, training, and 
interaction with previous musicians and audiences) is transcribed as notes on a page (which 
is an interpretation of the ‘music’ in her head). Moreover, the performers must interpret these 
notes, we know that there are many ways to perform the same eight notes (even guided by 
musical notation); moreover, this still may not accord with what the composed ‘heard’ in their 
head. Clearly, the crucial moments are in the translation of ideas from the composer to 
manuscript, and by the ensemble of musicians and conductors. This actor-network, not the 
laboratory, or composition studio, is a vital part of ‘making’ music. 
 
The importance of this social element of knowledge making, and the rejection of a dualistic 
ontologies (or making and transfer, and between codified and tacit) opens up a new realm for 
our studies. Critically, the role of embedding is also different from normative analyses, the 
context is now seen as co-constitutional. Commonly, ‘communities of practice’  (Wenger 1998) 
writing is embedded in a binary of text and context, and tacit and codified knowledge, however 
the notion of the social creation of value - if founded in a relational ontology of knowledge - 
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can offer a more sympathetic framework for the analysis of cultural practice (Amin and 
Cohendet 2003, Ibert 2007). 
 
Interestingly, this social making of knowledge is precisely the opposite of the ‘laboratory’ 
model which seeks to isolate the innovation. Traditionally, science and arts are considered as 
different modalities of knowledge creation (or more usually, ranked in a hierarchy of 
knowledge creation: science above the arts). If the laboratory is the norm; then inevitably the 
arts process is seen as inferior. But reverse the situation and there are a variety of cultural 
practices, which may or may not be controlled (or curated), or managed, or constrained. I 
simply want to argue in favour of an admission of the potential value of multiple sources and 
varieties of knowledge. Again, useful examples can be drawn out from the literature on music 
scenes as communities of practice (Straw 2001, Webb 2008). Such cases explore and 
exemplify the multiple flows and various justifications of (embedded) musical value, and social 
and cultural value. 
 
What I have discussed in this section is how a fixed version of knowledge (although it may be 
multiple) can be considered to be embedded in our innovation discourse. By contrast number 
of authors have stressed the relational nature of knowledge, although this is a restatement of 
a traditional network analysis. Value is achieved by organisation spatial position, and the 
assets accessed, in a network. It is the ‘build a better network’ (not just a mousetrap) to redirect 
the flow of knowledge across it. This seems like progress. However, I introduced a different 
notion of relational knowledge here, one that is commonly and obviously found in cultural 
economy (although it has increasingly been discussed as part of financial transactions): 
translation. A socially constructed notion of knowledge(s) that is/are situated and embedded 
in communities of practice, but more generally communities of ‘learning’/‘knowledge’/‘critique’. 
Such a notion is radical in the sense that not only does it erode the boundaries and stability of 
knowledges, but crucially, it transcends the dualism of transport and knowledge. The 
normative ‘lost in translation’, a combination of diffusion and loss (using a mechanical 
analogy), has to be reconfigured as ‘gained in translation’. In fact, translation, disputation, 
instability rather than being interference and loss are the very essence of innovation. 
Translation can, and does, occur at all points on a network.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter has been to open up the problem of ‘innovation’ with particular respect 
to the cultural economy. Much of the chapter has been taken up with showing how existing 
analyses obscure rather than clarify the analytical lens trained on innovation. Analyses of the 
cultural economy point to a number of problems with normative or standardised assumptions 
of economic analyses. Fundamentally normative approaches to economics and management 
(and their derivative discipline) present innovation as linear, atomistic, a-social and technically 
and economically reductive. Moreover, and more difficult to discuss, they make heroic 
assumptions about the nature of knowledge itself. Consequentially, I have sought ‘un-pick’ our 
understanding of knowledge, particularly that borrowed from scientific discourse. Many of the 
chapters in this collection point to dimensions of these approaches to innovation and their 
limiting factors. The analytical point that I want to make is that the underlying principles of 
these models need to be fundamentally challenged, simply recalibrating them is not sufficient. 
I have sought to take a bolder approach in this chapter, one that challenges normatively and 
incrementalism: one that is properly innovative. Central to my analysis has been the question 
of what knowledge is, and what we mean by knowledge transfer. I pointed out that this 
construction of the problem, and the dualism it is founded upon, is the fundamental challenge. 
I have argued here that these limiting factors may not be troubling in the analysis of 
manufacturing innovation and High-Fordism. However, the lens becomes a distorting one 
when focused on other sectors, time and places.  
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The cultural economy, I argued, is an instructive exemplar of these issues. In many respects, 
viewed through the normative lens, the creative economy is ‘exceptional’. I pointed out that 
more fundamentally the assumptions of normative studies were - in the case of the cultural 
economy - what needs to be explained. Hence, normative approaches are relatively ‘blind’ to 
innovation in the cultural economy. The chapter argued that in the cultural economy ‘value’ is 
‘live’, that is it is in a state of becoming. It’s translation to ‘being’ is a relational achievement, a 
complex interaction of various actors, institutions and networks, and objects. By contrast, 
normative theories are primarily concerned with knowledge and its movement, more or less 
effectively or efficiently, from one ‘stage’ to another. Critical approaches have stressed the 
situated and embedded nature of networks; however, this chapter has argued the need to take 
a thoroughgoing relational approach, one that not only looks at connections, but also at the 
relational co-construction of meaning and values. This is the potential of translation 
approaches: knowledge is remade in contexts; its value changing between situations. This is 
the core idea of ‘making in translation’, a creative and generative event. We can contrast this 
to the normative notion of ‘lost in translation', or ‘lost in transit’ where additive, or subtractive, 
notions of knowledge are deployed. To be sure, analyses of the cultural economy benefit from 
this perspective; but, they also suggest that the rest of the economy may also benefit from the 
application of a similar revolutionary science. 
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